Six METR employees are embedded at Anthropic with hardware, office space, and internal tool access comparable to Anthropic's own risk assessment teams, and can publish their findings without Anthropic approval. Anthropic can require redaction only in narrow predefined categories covering customer data, attorney-client privilege, and key IP; METR may publicly characterize even those redactions. A three-tier evaluator structure places METR at the top with near-full internal access, a second tier with similar publishing rights but less access, and a first tier including SecureBio for narrowly scoped investigations requiring Anthropic approval to publish. Accenture and Faculty are engaged for model evaluation, red-teaming, alignment assessments, and safeguard testing. METR's non-profit structure means it cannot be directed to avoid competitors, and it rotates staff to prevent evaluators from becoming too aligned with Anthropic over time.
Reviewing the unredacted August 2026 Risk Report, METR agreed overall risk is currently low, primarily because current models lack the capability to make catastrophic actions hard to reverse or hide from serious investigation. METR concluded it was "not confident that if risk were higher, the methodology in the report would reliably identify this". METR found the report's covert capability benchmarks too narrow and a poor proxy for evading Anthropic's real monitors, noting that Anthropic's offline monitors missed Mythos 5's supply chain attack during recent cyber incidents, despite Anthropic arguing Mythos 5 is unlikely to have strong covert capabilities. Mythos 5's social engineering in a recent UK AISI incident likely constitutes unknown severe context-dependent misalignment, which the risk report argued was unlikely, undermining several lines of evidence. A redacted footnote on historical concerning model behaviors, which METR reviewed, increased its concern about risks from sandbagging and undermining safety-relevant R&D. METR recommended end-to-end red-teaming of Anthropic's monitoring systems and that future reports consider risks from AI systems undermining safety-relevant decisions at Anthropic itself.
This pattern of agreeing with bottom-line conclusions while finding supporting evidence inadequate extends to earlier reviews. In March 2026, METR agreed catastrophic risk from Claude Opus 4.6 was "very low but not negligible" but flagged "several subclaims which are weak without more analysis and experimentation," with confidence partly grounded in Opus 4.6 having been publicly deployed for weeks without major incidents. In May 2026, reviewing the automated R&D section of Anthropic's February 2026 Risk Report, METR agreed with the low-risk conclusion but wrote that "the evidence presented in the report is inadequate to establish this" and identified that Anthropic "summarizes the survey results in a way that miscounts one missing response to a question as a negative response".